Expropriations of private property for economic 'development’ in the United States: re-thinking the titling and Rule of Law solutions to land grabs in the Global South by Thomson, Frances
estud. socio-juríd., bogotá (colombia), 22(2) 1
Expropriations of Private Property for 
Economic ‘Development’ in the United 
States: Re-Thinking the Titling and Rule 
of Law Solutions to Land Grabs in the 
Global South
Expropiaciones para el ‘desarrollo’ económico en los ee.uu.:  
repensar la titulación y el imperio de la ley como soluciones  
al despojo de tierras en el Sur global
Expropriações para o ‘desenvolvimento’ econômico nos eua:  
repensar a titulação e o império da lei como soluções de despojo  
de terras no Sul global
Frances Thomson*
Fecha de recepción: 29 de abril de 2019. Fecha de aprobación: 18 de ocTubre de 2019
Doi: https://doi.org/10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/sociojuridicos/a.7872
To cite this article: Thomson, F. (2020). Expropriations of private property for economic ‘development’ in the United 
States: re-thinking the titling and rule of law solutions to land grabs in the global South. Estudios Socio-Jurídicos, 22(2), 
1-31. Doi: https://doi.org/10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/sociojuridicos/a.7872
ABSTRACT
Mainstream discourses tend to treat land dispossession as a ‘developing’ country problem 
that arises due to weak/corrupt legal systems and inadequate property institutions. This 
article unsettles such discourses by examining expropriations for economic ‘development’ 
in the United States —a country typically deemed to have strong property institutions 
and a strong rule of law. Drawing on various examples, I propose that expropriation in 
the us is neither rigorously conditional nor particularly exceptional. While most ‘takings’ 
laws are supposed to restrict the State’s power, this restriction hinges on the definition of 
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n public use, purpose, necessity, or interest. And in many countries, including the us, these 
concepts are now defined broadly and vaguely so as to include private for-profit projects. 
Ultimately, the contents, interpretation, and application of the law are subject to social 
and political struggles; this point is habitually overlooked in the rule of law ‘solutions’ 
to land grabbing—. For these reasons, titling/registration programs and policies aimed at 
strengthening the rule of law, even if successful, are likely to transform rather than ‘solve’ 
dispossession in the global South.
Keywords: Expropriation, private property, dispossession, land grabbing, 
United States.
RESUMEN
Los discursos dominantes tienden a tratar el despojo de tierras como un problema de 
los países ‘en desarrollo’, derivado de sistemas legales débiles/corruptos e instituciones 
de propiedad inadecuadas. Este artículo desestabiliza esos discursos al examinar casos de 
expropiación en Estados Unidos (ee. uu.) —país al que normalmente se le considera con 
instituciones de propiedad robustas y un sólido estado de derecho—. Con base en varios 
ejemplos, argumento que las expropiaciones en ee. uu. no son rigurosamente condicio-
nadas ni particularmente excepcionales. Si bien la mayoría de las leyes de expropiación 
supuestamente restringen los poderes del Estado, esta restricción depende de la definición 
del uso, propósito, necesidad o interés público; además, en muchos países, incluido ee. 
uu., estos términos son definidos de manera amplia y vaga para así incluir proyectos 
privados con fines de lucro. En últimas, los contenidos, la interpretación y la aplicación 
de la ley están sujetos a luchas sociales y políticas —punto que suele ser pasado por al-
to en las ‘soluciones’ convencionales al despojo—. Por estas razones, los programas de 
titulación y las políticas dirigidas al fortalecimiento del estado de derecho (aun cuando 
sean exitosas) puede que transformen, más que resuelvan, el despojo en el Sur global.
Palabras clave: expropiación, propiedad privada, despojo de tierras,  Estados 
Unidos.
RESUMO
Os discursos dominantes tendem a tratar o despojo de terras como um problema dos 
países ‘em desenvolvimento’, derivado de sistemas legais fracos/corruptos e instituições 
de propriedade inadequadas. Este artigo desestabiliza esses discursos ao examinar casos 
de expropriação nos Estados Unidos —país ao que normalmente considera-se lhe com 
instituições de propriedade robustas e um sólido estado de direito—. Com base em vários 
exemplos, argumento que as expropriações nos eua não são rigorosamente condiciona-
das, nem particularmente excepcionais. Ainda que a maior parte das leis de expropriação 
supostamente restringem os poderes do Estado, esta restrição depende da definição do 
uso, propósito, necessidade ou interesse público; e em muitos países, incluídos os eua, 
estes termos são definidos de maneira ampla e vaga, para assim incluir projetos privados 
com fins lucrativos. Finalmente, os conteúdos, a interpretação e a aplicação da lei estão 
sujeitos a lutas sociais e políticas —ponto que pode ser ignorado nas ‘soluções’ conven-
cionais de despojo—. Por estes motivos, os programas de titulação e as políticas dirigidas 
ao fortalecimento do estado de direito (ainda quando sejam bem-sucedidas) pode que 
transformem, mais do que ‘resolver’, o despojo no Sul global.
Palavras-chave: expropriação, propriedade privada, despojo de terras, 
Estados Unidos.
3estud. socio-juríd., bogotá (colombia), 22(2). julio-diciembre de 2020 • issn 0124-0579 issne 2145-4531
ex
pr
o
pr
ia
t
io
n
s 
o
f 
pr
iv
a
t
e 
pr
o
pe
r
t
y
 f
o
r
 e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
 ‘d
ev
e
lo
pm
e
n
t
’ i
n
 t
h
e 
u
n
it
e
d
 s
ta
t
e
sIntroduction
Expropriation, or the forcible taking of private property by the State, 
is often associated with authoritarian or socialist regimes that garner 
support for redistributive policies; this association is reinforced by main-
stream media, which tends to focus on instances affecting large firms and 
foreign investors.1 Nevertheless, liberal democratic governments with 
capitalist market economies also expropriate for diverse ends —most no-
tably to make way for private investments alleged to bolster economic 
development— and the expropriated are commonly ‘ordinary’ people 
rather than big companies. In this sense and given that the less powerful 
are habitually under-compensated for their homes/land, expropriations 
frequently entail a regressive redistribution of wealth. This is the type 
of expropriation that interests me in this article, which focuses on the 
United States (us).
Expropriation became a central theme in the 2016 us presidential 
primaries (abc News, 2016; npr, 2016). Donald Trump was characteris-
tically uninhibited in his assessment: “The Key Stone pipeline without 
eminent domain [government power to expropriate], it wouldn’t go ten 
feet. […] You wouldn’t have massive factories without eminent domain” 
(cited in: abc News, 2016). In an earlier interview, he stated plainly: “You 
need eminent domain. It’s called economic development” (cited in: Fox 
News, 2015). He also said he agreed 100 % with the us Supreme Court’s 
controversial decision in the 2005 Kelo vs. New London case, which 
sanctioned expropriation in a wide variety of circumstances. It is note-
worthy that a Republican (us Republicans tend to be zealous defenders 
of private property and limited government), and a businessman openly 
1 Arguably, the most well-known instances of expropriation are those that were pushed 
forward by the Castro government in Cuba, Mugabe, in Zimbabwe, or Chávez, in Venezuela. 
The skewed view that expropriation is imposed exclusively by socialist governments has regained 
steam in the us due to the rising popularity of democratic socialism. Consider the following 
fragments from an article published on the Fox Business webpage: “Twenty years ago, Hugo 
Chavez started his socialist revolution: he confiscated valuable farm land […] That’s how socialists 
operate: expropriate. Take. Seize. […] He nationalized the oil business: his government just took 
it. Expropriation. […] socialism is immoral. It is wrong to seize property” (Varney, 2019). These 
issues (popular perceptions of expropriation, the way the issue is treated in mainstream media) 
certainly deserve closer analysis; for the purposes of this paper, however, anecdotal evidence 
will have to suffice.
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assumption, of course, is that it would never be his property subjected 
to expropriation. This assumption is well-founded: a statistical analysis 
of  expropriations in the us —specifically “for private to private trans-
fers of property for economic development”— shows that targeted areas 
are “disproportionately populated” by ethnic minorities and people with 
low incomes (Carpenter & Ross, 2009, pp. 2455-2456).
The ‘taking clause’ of the us Constitution, like the laws of other lib-
eral democracies, is alleged to restrict the government’s expropriation 
powers by making them conditional and exceptional. However, the 
limitation of these powers hinges on the definition of ‘public use’, which 
is now defined broadly and vaguely as ‘economic development’. In the 
words of us Supreme Court Judge O’Connor (2005): “Under the ban-
ner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable 
to being taken and transferred to another private owner” (p. 1). This is 
not a uniquely us phenomenon. Governments across the world have 
seized land for investments alleged to foster development —often just a 
euphemism for economic growth driven by capital accumulation— and 
many have changed the content or official interpretation of the law to 
facilitate such takings.
Expropriation, of course, is just one among many forms of disposses-
sion. Dispossession, more broadly, has received renewed attention in the 
context of the global land rush (Fairbairn, et al., 2014). Much of the recent 
land grab literature (see e. g., De Schutter, 2011; Deininger, et al., 2011; 
Abbink, 2011; Wily, 2011; Fairbairn, 2013) focuses on acquisitions for 
agricultural projects in countries where large segments of the population 
lack formally recognised rights to their lands, and legal systems are (at 
least allegedly) particularly weak or corrupt. Dispossession in the global 
North and in urban settings is rarely mentioned in this literature, and 
there are good reasons for this, such as the characteristics of the recent 
land rush2 and these scholars’ primary concern with agrarian political 
2 Starting in the mid to late 2000s, investors took an increasing interest in acquiring large 
areas of land, primarily for agricultural and commercial forestry projects, especially in Africa 
and Asia. See, for example, the World Bank’s (2011) Rising Global Interest in Farmland, reports 
by the ngo Grain or the Land Matrix webpage, which offers a platform for exploring data on 
large-scale land acquisitions.
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sion —in this case, the expropriation of urban land/homes— can enrich 
our understanding of the issue and sheds a different light on questions 
that are central to the land grab debate.
Mainstream explanations of dispossession suggest that it arises in the 
absence of clearly defined formal property rights and of a strong rule of 
law (see e. g., Deininger, 2003; Deininger, et al., 2011). As highlighted 
by Wolford, et al. (2013), it is often assumed that land grabs occur in 
fragile States and “that improved governance is the key to addressing 
the most problematic aspects” of this phenomenon (Wolford, et al., 
2013, p. 191). This article contributes to a critique of these claims by 
examining expropriations for economic ‘development’ in the us, typi-
cally deemed (at least in conventional accounts) to have strong private 
property institutions and a strong rule of law.
The us is a particularly relevant country-case3 for this article’s pur-
poses. Arguably, property rights have a political and cultural significance 
in the us that is unparalleled in, for example, European countries. Some 
commentators suggest this has deep historical roots: “Private property 
symbolizes the political and ideological beliefs upon which the United 
States is founded” (Jacobs, 2010). These ideas have a popular echo and 
are frequently mobilised in political discourse. Consider the following 
fragments from a speech given by former us Senator (and then pres-
idential candidate) John McCain (2007), precisely in response to the 
Kelo ruling discussed in this article:
central to our ideals is the sanctity of property rights. Without private 
property there can be no freedom, and without freedom there can be 
no America […] [this] was the motivating force behind our struggle to 
obtain independence. And in the years after achieving independence, 
3 Here, I use the us as an illustrative case; it serves, above all, a rhetorical purpose. I am 
not trying to suggest that expropriation is equally prevalent in all countries with clearly defined 
property rights and a forceful legal system. As argued below, the contents of the law and how it 
is interpreted/applied partly depends upon the balance of power within and between different 
groups and ongoing political and social struggles. This means that the prevalence and character 
(e. g., the purposes it is used for) of expropriation will vary between and within countries. My 
point is that clearly defined property rights and a forceful legal system do not necessarily protect 
against “legal” forms of dispossession, and the us case illustrates this argument well.
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were protected by our Constitution.
The article starts with an introduction to the issue of expropriation, 
which is typically presented as a conditioned exception to property 
rights. Then, section 2 presents an overview of the infamous Kelo case. 
Section three provides a critical analysis of the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Kelo v. New London. The discussion also refers to other relevant 
eminent domain cases/rulings. On the basis of these sections, I propose 
that expropriation in the us is neither rigorously conditional nor par-
ticularly exceptional. This examination of expropriation in the us calls 
into question simplistic assumptions about the relationship between 
dispossession on the one hand, and private property rights and the rule 
of law on the other.
The fourth section discusses the rule of law concept; because its 
definitions are contested and slippery, it is difficult to make sense of 
the claim that land dispossession is due to its weakness. I argue, echo-
ing other authors, that the legal realm is a site of constant struggle and, 
thus, the relationship between law and land grabbing is not merely a 
technical issue.
The final section briefly considers some broader conceptual/theoretical 
issues. Among other points, I indicate the importance of examining how 
property rights violations4 are used to mobilise land for growth driven by 
capital accumulation (capitalist development), something frequently over-
looked even by critical scholars, who commonly focus on privatizations 
and enclosures or the establishment and expansion of private property.
4 What constitutes a property rights violation is a matter of dispute. For example, some 
observers argue that “[w]ealth redistribution financed by taxation is a violation of the property 
rights of taxpayers” (Huemer, 2017, p. 268). The idea that the expropriation of land or buildings 
constitutes a violation of property rights is relatively less contentious. Nevertheless, given that 
expropriation, imposed in line with the law, is technically legal, some may argue against this idea. 
It is not my objective here to argue that expropriations violate property rights in the technical/
legal sense. I use the phrase ‘violation of property rights’ to contrast expropriations, specifical-
ly the taking of land under private title, with other forms of dispossession (e. g., enclosures of 
common land) that are associated with the imposition and expansion of private property. The 
question of what constitutes a property rights violation, in legal or philosophical terms, is beyond 
the scope of this article.
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Exception to Property Rights?
Legal systems worldwide refer to the State’s exclusive ‘right’ to take 
private property against the will of its owner —often called eminent 
domain or taking powers. The process itself is variously referred to as 
expropriation, appropriation, condemnation, forcible acquisition, or 
compulsory purchase. To avoid confusion, I use the term expropriation. 
Most country’s taking clauses require (a) that expropriation only be used 
where the public interest demands it —or variations on this theme, (b) 
that it follows a legal process, and (c) that the expropriated receive ‘just’ 
compensation. These conditions are said to distinguish expropriations 
under liberal democracy from arbitrary takings by despotic rulers. This 
article focuses on the first condition (a), which determines “the very 
scope of eminent domain power” (O’Connor, 2005, p. 4).
Modern takings laws —informed by the liberal notion of rights— are 
supposed to restrict the State’s power; expropriation is presented as an 
exception to property rules. For example, the 1789 French Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen proclaims: “Since property is an 
inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof except where 
public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then 
only on condition that the owner shall have been previously and equi-
tably indemnified”5 (Article 17). Similarly, the 5th Amendment of the us 
Constitution (also from 1789) states: “No person shall be […] deprived 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation”. The pub-
lic interest ‘exception’ is also contained in the European Convention 
on Human Rights (1952): “No one shall be deprived of his possessions 
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for 
by law”6 (fragment from Article 1).
Various forms of property may be subject to the government’s tak-
ing power, from entire companies to patents and trade secrets. Further-
more, lively legal debates on government takings have led to distinctions 
5 Emphasis added by the author.
6 Emphasis added by the author.
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easement takings.9 Many readers will be familiar with the notion of di-
rect expropriation: “A formal transfer of ownership of some asset from 
a private person or firm to the government, effected at the demand of 
the government and without regard to the desires of the private person 
or firm” (Chayes, et al., 2008). While this definition focuses on transfers 
to the government, eminent domain has increasingly been used to re-
allocate property rights to private entities. My focus here is on full and 
direct expropriations of land (and associated homes/buildings) specifi-
cally, and, in particular, those cases that favour private investors and are 
imposed in the name of economic ‘development’.
As stated previously, in most countries, governments are —legal-
ly— only allowed to expropriate for the public. Some legal texts refer 
to ‘public necessity’ (French Declaration of the Rights of Man), oth-
ers to ‘public use’ (us 5th Amendment), and others to ‘public interest’ 
(European Convention on Human Rights). The difference in wording is 
noteworthy since one would imagine this would influence the answer 
to the question: when can eminent domain be used? For example, the 
words: need and interest imply quite distinct things. But, in contrast to 
many traditions of legal interpretation, the word choice seems to make 
little difference.
Many governments have pushed the boundaries of what consti-
tutes an acceptable expropriation, beyond projects of public necessity, 
7 This is when a government violates property rights de facto without a formal process. 
The following is a commonly used example: a government constructs a dam, which floods an 
adjacent farm, making agriculture on that land unviable. The land has effectively been ‘taken’ 
from the farmer, as a result of a specific government action. In the us, this could be deemed 
a ‘functional equivalent’ to a ‘taking’. This is often called ‘inverse condemnation’ because the 
roles are reversed: the affected person initiates the proceedings rather than the government 
(us Department of Justice, 2015; Chayes et al., 2008).
8 In some instances, regulations more broadly (as opposed to specific actions, as per the 
definition of ‘indirect takings’) are also treated as takings (Chayes, et al., 2008); in addition to 
impacting property use and values, such regulations may even force people to relinquish their 
land (see e. g., Reason Tv, 2011). Some observers argue that any regulation that causes a prop-
erty to lose value requires compensation. Critics point out, among other things, that this would 
make almost all environmental policies unviable (Gray, 2013, p. 252).
9 For example, a government may forcibly acquire an easement —land use rights— to allow 
for example, oil pipelines on privately owned land (Cornell University Law School, 2007a; Gray, 
2013, p. 252). Easement takings are different to full and direct expropriations because they do 
not entail a transfer of ownership.
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particular to different countries. However, there is evidence that it is 
a global trend. For example, Levien (2013) details how by the 1990s 
“land [in India] was increasingly expropriated for any private purpose 
that represented a higher-value land use than agriculture —no matter 
how immaterial, consumptive or speculative” (p. 384). Meanwhile, in a 
number of African countries, clauses about “public purpose [... were] ex-
plicitly expanded in most land laws during the 1990-2010 era to include 
private investments” (Wily, 2012, p. 768). Similarly, “the Guatemalan 
Congress passed an eminent domain law in 2010 that would explicit-
ly allow the state to expropriate land on behalf of private companies” 
(Grandia, 2013, pp. 252-253). And, according to Gray and Porter (2015), 
“[p]owers of compulsory purchase [i. e., expropriation] for urban planning 
and redevelopment purposes have been significantly extended under 
recent planning legislative reforms in England and Scotland” (p. 388).
The subsequent two sections develop the argument that expropri-
ation in the us —alleged bastion of private property rights— is neither 
rigorously conditional nor particularly exceptional. There are indications 
this observation applies to other liberal democracies with capitalist market 
economies (see e. g., Gray & Porter, 2015; Levien, 2013); though further 
research is required to support this as a general claim.
The Kelo Case and Beyond: Expropriations 
for Private Investments
Though the weakening of constraints on government expropriation 
powers has a long history in the us (Pritchett, 2003; Werner, 2001), the 
infamous 2005 Kelo v. New London ruling is widely cited as a milestone in 
this process (Miceli, 2011, p. xi; Cornell University Law School, 2007a). 
This section introduces the Kelo case (setting the scene for section 3, 
which offers a critical analysis of the legal reasoning in Kelo v. New Lon-
don) and then briefly considers some of its antecedents.
In January 1998, the State of Connecticut “authorized a $5.35 
million bond issue” to finance the redevelopment of New London. A 
month later, the pharmaceutical company Pfizer announced plans to 
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Corporation (nldc)10 was in charge of plans for renewing the water-
front and downtown spaces, and of helping the city “capitalize on the 
arrival of the Pfizer facility”. The plans focused on the Fort Trumbull 
area and included a conference centre and hotel, parking lot, office 
buildings, new housing, retail and dining, river walkway, and marina, 
among other things (Stevens, 2005, pp. 2-3). The city authorised the 
nldc to purchase and —if necessary— expropriate properties in order to 
carry out the redevelopment. The intention was to lease the acquired 
land to private developers. While the legal battles described below were 
on-going, “the nldc was negotiating a 99-year ground lease with [the 
firm] Corcoran Jennison […] [that] contemplated a nominal rent of $1 
per year” (Stevens, 2005, p. 13).
Most owners —of the 115 properties the city wanted to tear down— 
sold ‘voluntarily’. The quotation marks are deliberately placed since, as 
one of the city’s councillors noted, the mere threat of expropriation is 
often sufficient to pressure a sale (cited in: Somin, 2015). Many were 
bullied into selling by various means (Somin, 2015). But nine owners 
—of 15 properties— resisted. They included, among others: Susette Kelo, 
who is said to have fallen in love with her “little pink house” (Kelo was 
designated ‘lead plaintiff’, hence the naming of the case); Wilhelmina 
Dery, who had lived in her home since she was born in 1918; and the 
Cristofaro family, who moved to Fort Trumbull after being forced out of 
“their previous home [which] had been condemned as part of an[other] 
urban renewal project” (Somin, 2015).
In 2000, the nldc initiated expropriation proceedings for the 15 
properties it had been unable to acquire through private negotiations. 
The owners took legal action (with the support of the Institute for Jus-
tice) in an attempt to halt the seizures. They argued, among other things, 
that the taking of their properties for economic development did not 
meet the ‘public use’ requirement and was thus an unconstitutional 
10 “The nldc [which the City authorities delegated with eminent domain powers] is a 
private, nonprofit corporation whose mission is to assist the city council in economic develop-
ment planning. It is not elected by popular vote, and its directors and employees are privately 
appointed” (O’Connor, 2005, pp. 2-3).
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sabuse of eminent domain (Somin, 2015; Cornell University Law School, 
2007b; Stevens, 2005).
In 2002, the New London Superior Court prevented the seizure 
of 11 buildings, arguing that “the condemnations were not reasonably 
necessary and that future use of the[se] parcel[s] was uncertain” (Cor-
nell University Law School, 2007b). However, it approved the expro-
priation of those properties that were to be torn down for the office 
buildings and parking lot. Both sides appealed. In 2004, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court approved all 15 of the expropriations. Finally, in 2005, 
the us Supreme Court agreed to review the 2004 judgement and “to 
determine whether a city’s decision to take property for the purpose of 
economic development satisfies the public use requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment” (Stevens, 2005, p. 5). Their answer was yes. The Court 
ruled —with 5 in favour (or ‘concurring’) and 4 against (or ‘dissenting’)— 
that the expropriation of private property for economic development 
can be considered a constitutional application of eminent domain.
As of 2016, more than ten years after the us Supreme Court ruling, 
the Fort Trumbull area was a “wasteland”. Deals with numerous devel-
opers floundered, and, in 2009, Pfizer closed down its research facility 
in New London, shortly before its generous tax incentives expired. The 
expropriations failed to stimulate economic development and the prom-
ised jobs this was supposed to entail (iFj, 2016b; Torres, 2014).
What happened to Susette Kelo and her neighbours was not new, 
nor was it particularly unusual. In the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, expropriation powers were “used to support the expansion of 
the nascent economy” in several parts of the us (Pritchett, 2003, p. 9). 
For example, in the late 1800s, the Nevada Supreme Court defended 
the use of eminent domain to favour a mining company, arguing that “all 
other interests are subservient” to the industry since “the present pros-
perity of the state is entirely due to the mining developments” (Dayton 
Gold & Silver Mining Co v Seawell, 1876, cited in: Stevens, 2005, p. 17). 
Though “state courts vacillated between support for an expansive use of 
eminent domain and a fear that condemnation would be abused to the 
detriment of individual property rights”, the us federal Supreme Court 
“when it considered such matters […] was generally amenable to the 
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2003, pp. 9-11; see also Werner, 2001, pp. 342-343).
In the 1930s, city planners, real estate firms, and politicians formed an 
alliance to promote urban renewal and eliminate ‘blight’ —blamed for 
social problems and economic stagnation— using eminent domain 
(Pritchett, 2003, pp. 14-21). In 1949, the us government passed the 
Housing Act, permitting federal money to be given to local authorities 
to buy up or expropriate ‘blighted’ properties, which they would then 
destroy so that the land could be resold to developers, often at a loss 
(Simon, 2004, p. 142; Pritchett, 2003, pp. 26-36). Some questioned 
the constitutionality of transferring expropriated lands to private inves-
tors. But, in 1954 (Berman v. Parker), the us Supreme Court determined 
that takings for urban (re)development, including cases where “the land 
would be leased or sold to private parties” (cited in: Stevens, 2005, 
p. 11), were constitutional. In the 1950s-1960s, more than a million 
people were forced from their homes to make way for such urban re-
newal projects (Pritchett, 2003, p. 47).
The urban renewal concept later lost the widespread support it had 
enjoyed in the post-war years, but expropriation continued and was/
is often defended as a means of securing job-generating investments 
(Pritchett, 2003, pp. 48-50). Another oft-cited case is that of Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit (1981), in which the Michigan 
Supreme Court endorsed expropriations for a new General Motors 
plant. Pritchett (2003) explains: “To keep General Motors from building 
elsewhere, the city spent over $200 million to acquire and prepare the 
property [displacing more than 4000 people and destroying a racially 
diverse neighbourhood in the process], which it sold to the company 
for $8 million [i. e., at a substantial loss]” (pp. 48-49).
The us Institute for Justice, which claims to “defend homes and 
businesses from government land grabs” (iFj, 2017), found over 10 200 
cases “of actual or threatened condemnation [expropriation] for private 
parties between 1998 through 2002”. It is important to note that many 
people cannot afford the costs of a legal challenge and are forced to sell 
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s‘voluntarily’ under the threat of expropriation.11 This figure, for just four 
years, “represents only the tip of the iceberg”, since there is no “official 
database” and many cases “go entirely unreported in public sources” 
(Berliner, 2003, p. 2).
In short, the 2005 Kelo v. New London ruling endorsed previous le-
gal decisions and the well-established practice of expropriating farmers, 
homeowners, and small businesses to make way for private investments 
alleged to foster broader economic development.
The Legal Reasoning: Private Projects as Public Purpose
As suggested above, it is unclear what is novel about the Kelo case 
in and of itself. Perhaps the main reason it generated a glut of citations 
(including my own) is that it was the first major federal us Supreme Court 
ruling on eminent domain and the meaning of ‘public use’ specifically, 
since 1984. Or maybe the key difference, compared to earlier rulings, 
lies in the explicit use of the term ‘economic development’. Either way, 
the Kelo texts are insightful, as they trace a cumulative loosening of the 
conditions under which the exercise of eminent domain is permissible. 
This section draws on the Kelo decision (concurring and dissenting 
opinions), including reference to earlier legal cases.
The question posed in the 2005 Kelo ruling is whether econom-
ic development is a constitutionally valid public use. Underneath this 
overarching question lies a number of other issues discussed in previous 
hearings, ultimately dismissed by the Court. The logical order is to ask 
the main question first, since if the answer to this is no, then all other 
issues are irrelevant. However, for the sake of structural clarity, I leave 
the primary point until near the end.
(1) An issue that can arise in court proceedings is whether a given 
expropriation is necessary in order to achieve the stated public use or 
purpose (e. g., could the land be acquired elsewhere via voluntary market 
11 “A deal struck voluntarily is quite different than a deal struck with someone who says, 
‘hand it over, or we’ll take it by force’. In many ways, the number of threatened uses of emi-
nent domain for private parties tells more than the number that were actually filed” (Berliner, 
2003, p. 6).
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prohibited the seizure of some properties in Fort Trumbull was precise-
ly because ‘the condemnations were not reasonably necessary’ (see 
above). But the us Supreme Court refused “to second-guess the City’s 
determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire” (Stevens, 2005, 
p. 12). Analysts from the Institute for Justice argue, more generally, that 
court rulings in the us have set a precedent in which the government is 
not obligated to show “that it actually needs the property in question” 
(iFj, 2016a).
(2) Judges may ask whether the ‘intended use’ of the land ‘is suffi-
ciently definite’. The second reason the New London Superior Court 
provided for denying the seizure of some properties in the City was 
‘that future use of the parcel was uncertain’ (see above). This question 
is especially relevant where the land is passed into private ownership, 
or in cases where the long-term lease conditions are vague, barring as-
surances of the new land use, which allegedly justifies the dispossession 
(on a similar point see Werner, 2001, p. 344).
(3) Linked to the above, the court may consider how likely it is that 
the purported public benefits will actually occur. In the 2004 Connecticut 
Court proceedings, “the three dissenting justices […] would have found 
all the takings unconstitutional because the City had failed to adduce 
‘clear and convincing evidence’ that the economic benefits of the plan 
would in fact come to pass”12 (Stevens, 2005, p. 5). The 2005 ruling 
made clear that the us Supreme Court did not believe it was responsi-
ble for ‘judging’ the ‘efficacy’ of a ‘development plan’. This is significant 
given that many people have been forced from their homes, only for the 
area to be abandoned, causing economic decline rather than prosperity.
Overall, the implication of the Kelo ruling is that government au-
thorities (or the delegated agency) are not legally bound to provide ev-
idence that any given expropriation is necessary, has a clearly defined 
objective (i. e., certainty regarding the intended use of the land), nor 
that the alleged public benefits will actually be achieved. The Kelo rul-
ing did not set a precedent in this sense, as earlier judicial decisions had 
already established the view that “courts are ill-equipped to evaluate the 
12 Emphasis added by the author.
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sefficacy of proposed legislative initiatives” and to “evaluate whether, in 
a given case, eminent domain is a necessary means by which to pursue 
the legislature’s ends” (O’Connor, 2005, p. 7; see also Pritchett, 2003; 
Werner, 2001).
(4) The question inevitably arises as to whether it is acceptable for the 
State to force a transfer of land from one private party to another. The 
us Courts established long ago that expropriated land may be passed to 
private parties when the beneficiary is entrusted with providing a public 
service. In the Kelo case, the concurring judges acknowledged that the 
intended land use was not primarily to provide services for the general 
public. However, they did not rule against the expropriations on the 
grounds that public use should be understood more broadly as public 
purpose (in this case, defined principally as the generation of jobs and 
taxes) and that “the government’s pursuit of a public purpose will often 
benefit individual private parties” (Stevens, 2005, p. 10). Nevertheless, 
“the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of 
transferring it to another private party B”13 (Stevens, 2005, pp. 5-6, em-
phasis added). Put simply: the us legal system allows for expropriated 
land to be passed into private ownership or control, so long as this is not 
the sole objective. According to the judges’ reasoning, no expropriation in 
favour of a private company could be ruled against as a ‘purely private 
taking’, in so far as they all employ people and pay taxes. Put different-
ly: if the promise of new jobs and additional tax revenue is sufficient 
to constitute a public purpose, then most private enterprises fulfil these 
criteria. Following that logic, all private for-profit ventures are redefined 
as projects of public purpose, and practically any private company with 
enough political clout is an eligible beneficiary of expropriation.
(5) The judges recognise the risk that the government might disguise 
private interests as public ones: “Nor would the City be allowed to take 
property under the mere pretext of a public purpose” (Stevens, 2005, 
p. 6). In the 2004 Kelo case, the plaintiffs argued that the expropriations 
would primarily “benefit [the] private entities […] Corcoran Jennison 
and Pfizer” (Norcott, 2004, p. 27). The Supreme Court justices rejected 
this view and agreed with the Connecticut judgement, which concluded 
13 Emphasis added by the author.
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2005, p. 6). The validity of a taking essentially boils down to how the 
authorities justify the expropriation and the official paper trail. So long 
as the documents reiterate a public interest motive and refrain from 
disclosing any intention to benefit a particular firm, the expropriation is 
likely to pass the legal test.14
(6) The main question: what is public use? As far back as the nine-
teenth century, us judges argued that the term ‘use’ should not be un-
derstood literally and opted to replace it with the term ‘purpose’. The 
Kelo ruling states two main rationales for this change: (a) “the ‘use by the 
public’ test [was] difficult to administer” and (b) “it proved to be imprac-
tical given the diverse and always evolving needs of society” (Stevens, 
2005, p. 6). The judges provide a brief example of why it is difficult to 
establish a test of public use: “What proportion of the public need have 
access to the property? at what price?” (Stevens, 2005). Suffice to say 
that the dominant legal opinion would find ‘public use’ too restrictive 
even if there were a consistent formula for establishing it. As Stevens 
(2005) summarises, in the past, us Courts ruled that a variety of aims 
may qualify as a public purpose. In this case, the City of New London 
“formulated an economic development plan that it believes will provide 
appreciable benefits to the community, including —but by no means 
limited to— new jobs and increased tax revenue” (Stevens, 2005, p. 9). 
And it is up to regional and local authorities, not the Supreme Court, 
the judges argue, to determine ‘public needs’15 (Stevens, 2005, p. 10).
The implications are severe. If pubic use, purpose, interest, benefit, 
or needs are defined as widely and vaguely as ‘economic development’, 
then governments can expropriate for practically any project they claim 
will bring investment to an area and create more monetary value than the 
current land use standing in its way. In brief, the answer to the question: 
when can eminent domain be used? is whenever the government sees 
14 As argued by dissenting judge O’Connor (2005), the ruling “maintains a role for courts 
in ferreting out takings whose sole purpose is to bestow a benefit on the private transferee […]. 
Whatever the details of Justice Kennedy’s undisclosed test, it is difficult to envision anyone but 
the ‘stupid staff[er]’ failing it” (p. 10).
15 The dissenting judges are critical of this idea: “An external, judicial check on how the 
public use requirement is interpreted, however limited, is necessary if this constraint on govern-
ment power is to retain any meaning” (O’Connor, 2005, p. 5).
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sfit, so long as (a) the change in land use is alleged to generate economic 
development and (b) so long the authorities claim they have the public 
interest at heart (see O’Connor, 2005). Even before the Kelo ruling, 
“[l]egal scholars from [diverse] perspectives […] [had] argue[d] that gov-
ernment powers of eminent domain are practically limitless” (Pritchett, 
2003, p. 2; see also Werner, 2001).
(7) The logic of the ruling is inherently biased against certain groups, 
namely, small businesses and low-income households. On the one hand, 
it is often assumed (though this is not necessarily the case) that large 
companies generate more jobs and tax revenues than small businesses. 
On the other hand, given that property taxes are anchored to value, 
poor people’s homes can easily be razed to make way for luxury apart-
ments (or office buildings, casinos, and factories) on the grounds they 
will generate more government income. Both dissenting opinions from 
the Kelo case converge on this issue, as well as the influence of political 
power on the outcomes:
Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private 
party, but the fallout from this decision will not be random. The benefi-
ciaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and 
power in the political process […]. As for the victims, the government 
now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources 
to those with more (O’Connor, 2005, pp. 12-13).
The consequences of today’s decision are not difficult to predict […] 
extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any economically 
beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately 
on poor communities […] [who are] not only systematically less like-
ly to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but are also the 
least politically powerful (Thomas, 2005, pp. 17-18).
The issue of ‘blight’ (the word itself is derogatory, denoting disease 
or infestation) indicates another way in which expropriation in the us is 
class- and race-biased. In the Kelo case, neither the properties nor the 
neighbourhood itself was said to have suffered from blight (Stevens, 
2005, p. 4). However, the implicit assumption in the ruling is that it is 
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held that some us state laws (e. g., California) only permit expropriations 
“for economic development purposes in blighted areas” (Stevens, 2005, 
p. 18). Of course, low-income families are more likely to live in so-called 
‘blighted’ properties “considered less worthy of the full bundle of prop-
erty rights recognized by American law” (Pritchett, 2003, p. 4). Pritchett 
(2003) argues, furthermore, that redevelopment schemes —justified using 
the blight concept— played a key role in perpetuating and deepening 
“racial segregation” (p. 6). Indeed, in the 1950s/1960s urban renewal 
came to be seen as synonymous with ‘negro removal’ (Pritchett, 2003, 
p. 47; Werner, 2001, p. 351). In the much-cited Berman v. Parker (1954) 
case, Washington DC authorities deemed an entire neighbourhood to 
be ‘insanitary’ and ‘unsightly’. But providing inhabitants with subsidies 
to stimulate repairs or rebuilding was apparently not an option, arguably 
because the real issue was never the community’s living conditions. Some 
4500 African American families were forcibly displaced, and the majority 
could not afford to return: “Of the 5900 new buildings constructed in 
the area, only 310 were classified as moderately-priced housing units” 
(Whose Downtown?, 2013; Pritchett, 2003, pp. 46-47).
(8) The harms caused by expropriation apparently have no import 
from the legal perspective. While the question of benefits (point 3 
above) was considered and dismissed as beyond the court’s purview, 
in the concurring judgement the injury, or in economists’ terminology 
‘costs’, inflicted by the expropriations did not even arise for dismissal.16 
Ironically, very few expropriations are subjected to cost-benefit analysis 
(cba). Of course, the deficiencies of cba are boundless, but it is worth 
highlighting the hypocrisy of an establishment obsessed by this method. 
The economics discipline has apparently invaded all areas of law and 
policy, except where you might expect it most: expropriations justified 
on quintessentially utilitarian grounds.
In conclusion, in light of the Kelo ruling, the idea that contemporary 
takings law is a limitation on government power starts to wither. The 
16 The dissenting judges touch upon the issue of harm by emphasising the social inequity 
implications. Justice Thomas (2005) also mentions personal injuries: “No compensation is possible 
for the subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced and the indignity inflicted by 
uprooting them from their homes” (p. 17).
19estud. socio-juríd., bogotá (colombia), 22(2). julio-diciembre de 2020 • issn 0124-0579 issne 2145-4531
ex
pr
o
pr
ia
t
io
n
s 
o
f 
pr
iv
a
t
e 
pr
o
pe
r
t
y
 f
o
r
 e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
 ‘d
ev
e
lo
pm
e
n
t
’ i
n
 t
h
e 
u
n
it
e
d
 s
ta
t
e
sruling provides legal confirmation of what has long been a reality in 
practice in the us and in other parts of the world. That this text should 
come from the us Supreme Court is particularly significant given that 
the country is typically considered (at least, in conventional accounts) 
to have a strong rule of law that favours the defence of private property 
rights in particular.
Tackling Land Grabs in the Global South 
Via Titling and the Rule of Law?
As noted above, mainstream explanations of land dispossession 
—focused on the global South— suggest that it arises in the absence of 
clearly defined property rights and a strong rule of law. Qualitative evi-
dence does indicate that people without formal statutory rights are more 
vulnerable to dispossession, effected by the State and private agents, 
than their counterparts with legal title (see e. g., Deininger, 2003; Wily, 
2011, 2012; Velasco, 2014; Fairbairn, et al., 2014; Gutiérrez Sanín & 
Vargas Reina, 2016). However, this is merely one among many enabling 
conditions for dispossession, which is neither necessary nor sufficient. 
Put very simply: even people with property rights over their land/homes 
have been dispossessed in the us and elsewhere. Given the simplicity 
of the former point, the remainder of this section focuses on the rule of 
law component of the argument.
At the most basic level, a country is said to have a ‘weak rule of law’ 
if the government is unable/unwilling to enforce legal norms, or itself 
violates them. A strong rule of law is said to be essential for protecting 
groups with less power and resources against dispossession since “self-en-
forcement will be highly correlated with individuals’ wealth” (Deininger, 
2003, p. 24). For example, elite landowners are more likely to be able to 
afford fences and guards to defend their land claims (Deininger, 2003, 
p. 24). Conversely, powerful and wealthy individuals can act with im-
punity and take others’ land where the rule of law is weak.
However, the rule of law is a contested and slippery concept (Cole-
man, 2018; Waldron, 2016; Mattei & Nader, 2008). Some definitions 
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the content of the law. For example, the law itself should be impersonal, 
stable, and, thus, predictable, clear and disseminated as public knowledge; 
an impartial tribunal should be in charge of administering the law; the 
reasons for its decisions should be based on arguments and evidence, 
and made available to the affected parties; and the latter have a right 
to be present and represented at a hearing (incomplete list based on 
Waldron, 2016). But if the concept is limited to such principles, we must 
reject the proposition that dispossession occurs due to a weak rule of 
law because the law itself may sanction it.
Many people simply assume the rule of law comprises the protec-
tion of private property. Some actually assert that stable and imper-
sonal property rules are “the essence of the rule of law” (Cass cited in 
Waldron, 2016). According to Coleman (2018), “a specific vision of the 
‘rule of law’ that has nothing to do with the rights of citizenship and 
everything to do with property rights” (p. 5) has become predominant 
in the neoliberal era. Accepting that the defence of private property is 
part of the rule the law, implies adopting a “substantive” definition (i. e. 
going beyond the formal and procedural), and this “inaugurates a sort 
of competition in which everyone clamors to have their favorite political 
ideal incorporated […] such as human rights or democracy […] The 
upshot is that people struggle to use the same term to express disparate 
ideals” (Waldron, 2016).
The ambiguity of the rule of law concept, nevertheless, is not resolved 
by focusing on the protection of private property as its main substantive 
component. Multiple observers have argued that expropriations for pri-
vate projects violate the right to property and the requirement that such 
takings only be used for the public benefit. So, should we conclude that 
the us, for example, has a weak rule of law? To reiterate: the rule of law 
concept is contested and slippery, making it difficult to make sense of 
the claim that land dispossession is due to its weakness.
Furthermore, the rule of law, which under liberal substantive defini-
tions includes the protection of property, is often treated as a technical 
issue. If dispossession is widespread, then the solution is to change the 
law or improve impartial enforcement mechanisms: “Legal reform is 
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risk of land loss or expropriation” (Deininger, 2003, p. 75). I do not 
wish to discount the idea that some legal reforms could help protect 
against dispossession. However, the content of the law and how it is 
interpreted and applied depends on ideology, the changing balance of 
power between different (inter and intraclass) groups, and the multiple 
constraints and pressures faced by the government.
Theoretically, the “Rule of Law is supposed to lift law above politics” 
(Waldron, 2016), but this is a fantasy. In practice, the legal realm is a 
site of constant struggle. This is true all over the world, not just in the 
global South or in countries deemed to have ‘fragile’ governments. For 
example, according to the Institute for Justice, “the parties who gain from 
eminent domain abuse [in the us…] have disproportionate influence in 
the political arena […] [and] have fought hard against eminent domain 
reform” (iFj, 2010). Furthermore, what changes have been achieved, in 
some us states, were attained through tireless “grassroots activism” (iFj, 
2010). To give another example: Pritchett’s (2003) historical analysis of 
the ‘blight’ concept reveals the different ways elites organised support 
for urban redevelopment via slum clearance, influencing the interpre-
tation of us law (pp. 51, 14-34). In short, it is not a technical problem. 
As argued by Mattei and Nader (2008)
[t]he dominant image of the rule of law […] is false historically 
and in the present […] [it] starts from the [erroneous] idea that good 
law (which others ‘lack’) is autonomous, separate from society and its 
institutions, technical, non-political, non-distributive (p. 5).
To clarify, it is not that the content of the laws, the government’s 
ability to enforce them, and the nature of the judicial system do not mat-
ter; they do. The problem is fetishizing legal reform and other technical 
fixes. Policy-oriented researchers who blame dispossession on a weak 
rule of law often ignore power relations and ideology or treat them as 
exogenous factors. Borras and Franco (2010) put forward a similar argu-
ment in their analysis of the discourses surrounding ‘land governance’; 
they show how policies and programs that are treated as ‘technical’ and 
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and “democratic land governance”, they argue, demands recognition 
of this fact and then strengthening “autonomous” rural “mobilisations”, 
identifying and supporting allies in government, and ensuring “mutually 
reinforcing interactions between” them (pp. 23-24).
So, the most obvious implication of the discussion presented above 
is that the formal recognition of tenure rights plus a strong rule of law 
(definitional issues momentarily aside) do not protect against all forms 
of dispossession. This statement may appear to be a truism, but it is 
often assumed that the problems associated with the global land rush 
may be resolved by granting titles, improving registers, strengthening 
governance, and eliminating corruption. Institutions such as the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (Fao) and the World Bank 
are right to emphasise the vulnerability of people without formally rec-
ognised land rights and the role of incompetent or unscrupulous govern-
ment agents in creating the conditions for certain types of dispossession. 
However, overall, “portrayals of the state as weak or corrupt and of the 
need for good governance as a solution to the excesses of expropriation 
are overly facile” (Wolford, et al., 2013, p. 206).
Titling programs and improvements to the rule of law (imagining, 
for the sake of argument, we agree on what the latter means and that 
both ‘solutions’ can be effectively implemented) are likely to transform 
rather than ‘solve’ dispossession. Supposing ‘illegal’ dispossession (i. e., 
that without official State sanction) effected by private agents or corrupt 
government functionaries could be eliminated, we are still left with the 
question of ‘legal’ dispossession. And dispossession —with all the attributes 
of an orderly, efficient, transparent legal process— is still dispossession.
The issue of expropriation is sometimes reduced to the idea that so 
long as ‘just’ compensation is paid, it’s acceptable. There are two main 
problems with this view: 1) In the us and elsewhere, the systems used 
for determining ‘just’ compensation tend to systematically ‘undercom-
pensate’ people without power and resources (Berliner, 2003; Cernea, 
2004; Levien, 2011; Miceli, 2011; N. Gray & Porter, 2015). It is worth 
asking if the dispossessed/displaced were truly ‘made whole’ would the 
project for which they were removed remain financially viable, relative 
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under-compensation is often an in-built attribute of ‘legal’ dispossession, 
not a mere oversight. 2) Non-financial and immaterial losses are ignored, 
or it is falsely assumed that they can be cancelled out with additional 
money or the right policies. Because many people value their homes, 
farms, or territories for non-monetary reasons, dispossession ethics can-
not be restricted to compensation.
In sum, the titling/formalisation and the rule of law solutions to 
land dispossession tend to downplay the importance of power relations, 
de-politicise inherently ideological questions, and sweep away ethical 
debates by masking them as technical problems.
From Privatisations and Enclosures 
to Expropriations of Private Property
The discussion presented in this article also has implications for the 
way critical scholars approach the issue of dispossession. Contempo-
rary scholarship on land grabbing largely focuses on the imposition and 
expansion of property rights or privatisation and enclosure, especially 
those that draw on Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation and Har-
vey’s notion of accumulation by dispossession (a discussion of this issue 
is provided in Hall, 2013). This makes sense in so far as dispossession 
linked to these processes is ongoing in many parts of the world. How-
ever, the expropriation of private property is also an important form 
of dispossession, including in the global South (see e. g., Levien, 2011; 
2013; Velasco, 2014); the concepts and theories we use to explain and 
understand dispossession should be refined to reflect this fact.
The terms ‘enclosure’ and ‘expropriation’ are sometimes used inter-
changeably (see e. g., White, Borras Jr., Hall, Scoones & Wolford, 2012; 
see also Hall, 2013). Though many dictionaries define ‘expropriation’ as 
any unspecified act of dispossession, as explained earlier, the term also 
has a more specific meaning: the forcible taking of private property by 
the State. Arguably, the flexible use of dispossession-related vocabulary 
(with very different connotations) can generate conceptual confusion. 
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ready physically and socially ‘enclosed’, so it makes little sense to call 
dispossession achieved through expropriation ‘enclosure’. Also, while 
enclosure often signifies the imposition of exclusionary private prop-
erty rights over common lands (though there may be exceptions such 
as the fencing of forests for State-owned conservation areas), expropri-
ation implies a violation of private property rights. Finally, government 
agencies are central ‘actors’ in expropriation processes; in contrast, the 
enclosure of common land can be imposed by private actors with or 
without official State sanction.
In the most basic sense, from the perspective of the dispossessed 
and displaced, it does not matter whether the seized land had legal 
title. Furthermore, the public interest justification is used and abused 
no matter what type of land-holding is affected. However, the issue is 
relevant when considering mainstream narratives, which portray a lack 
of clearly defined property rights as the main problem and formalisation 
programs (alongside the rule of law) as the central solution.
Some business representatives and mainstream economists suffer from 
a sort of cognitive dissonance when it comes to State-backed dispossession. 
On the one hand, they maintain that ‘efficient’ land allocation and use 
is best assured through voluntary transactions within a context of free 
markets and private property rights. On the other hand, they also accept 
that many investments or ‘development’ projects could not or would not 
proceed without coercive land acquisition. Few scholars or policymakers 
have attempted to address this apparent tension systematically. Arguably, 
there is reluctance to acknowledge that the capitalist land regime is laden 
with internal contradictions, and perpetuating growth based on capital 
accumulation relies on both the imposition and the violation of private 
property rights in land (see Thomson, 2019). Unfortunately, the role of 
property rights violations in mobilising land for capital accumulation and 
economic growth is frequently overlooked even by critical dispossession 
scholars (Gray & Porter’s 2015 article is a notable exception),17 who —as 
17 Gray and Porter (2015) advance arguments that are closely aligned with those presented 
in this article. Drawing on an examination of expropriations for ‘urban regeneration’ in Glasgow 
(Scotland), they argue that the “suspension of normal private property rights” is an example of 
the “normalisation” of the “state of exception”. These expropriations are imposed in the name 
25estud. socio-juríd., bogotá (colombia), 22(2). julio-diciembre de 2020 • issn 0124-0579 issne 2145-4531
ex
pr
o
pr
ia
t
io
n
s 
o
f 
pr
iv
a
t
e 
pr
o
pe
r
t
y
 f
o
r
 e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
 ‘d
ev
e
lo
pm
e
n
t
’ i
n
 t
h
e 
u
n
it
e
d
 s
ta
t
e
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of private property. This omission is detrimental to a comprehensive 
understanding of land dispossession, in all its forms.
Consider that numerous governments in the global South are simul-
taneously attempting to construct capitalist land markets based on a 
respect for private ownership, while at the same time using their taking 
powers to violate these newly established property rights. Hence, the 
ostensible paradox mentioned above —that capitalist economies depend 
on both the imposition/enforcement and the violation of private prop-
erty rights— is intensified in contexts where land markets are still under 
construction. Some governments have understood that private property 
in land can act as both a driver of and an obstacle to growth and profits; 
they have, therefore, opted to impose the system partially, excluding 
some areas from privatisation. State-owned lands allow governments 
to promote large-scale investments (by leasing or selling large areas 
of land), which otherwise might have required expropriations, usually 
implying higher compensation costs and lengthier legal processes. Peo-
ple are often denied titles so that land can easily be mobilised to serve 
economic growth; they are kept vulnerable to dispossession on purpose 
(see Thomson, 2019; on the final point see also Wily, 2011).
In sum, the analysis presented in this article not only serves to chal-
lenge mainstream discourses on land grabbing in ‘developing’ countries; 
it also points to the need for conceptual and theoretical innovation in 
critical dispossession scholarship focused on the global South.
Conclusion
The us is conventionally portrayed as a bastion of private property 
rights. Nevertheless, the evidence presented above indicates that expro-
priation in the us is neither rigorously conditional nor particularly excep-
tional. Further research is required to make this a general proposition 
about liberal democracies with capitalist market economies, but the us 
of “the public interest”, which “is whatever the state says it is […] framed within the growth-based 
economic logic of late capitalism” (Gray & Porter, 2015, pp. 383, 391 and 393).
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earlier, various countries have changed their laws or (re)interpreted 
existing ones in ways that facilitate ‘legal’ dispossession for private in-
vestments projected to generate more monetary value than the existing 
land use. The arguments put forward have important corollaries for the 
way we think about the relationship between property rights, the rule 
of law, and dispossession.
One of my main objectives in this article was to use cases from the 
us to shed a different light on land grabs in the global South. Mainstream 
discourses tend to treat dispossession as a ‘developing’ country problem 
blamed on weak and corrupt legal systems and inadequate property 
institutions. Of course, the contents of a country’s laws and the govern-
ment’s willingness and ability to apply them do influence the prevalence 
and character of dispossession. It is also true that people without for-
mally recognised rights are more vulnerable to coercive land acquisi-
tions. Nevertheless, titling/registration programs and reforms aimed at 
strengthening the rule of law are likely to transform, rather than solve, 
the problems surrounding land dispossession. In the cases discussed 
above, the dispossessed had formally recognised property rights, but 
the State used its eminent domain powers to override them. Whether 
or not these expropriations should be attributed to a deteriorating rule of 
law in the us ultimately depends on how one defines this concept. In 
any case, the content of the law and how it is interpreted and applied 
depends on ideology, the balance of power between different groups, 
and the constraints and pressures faced by the government. Note that 
many of those involved in grassroots struggles against coercive land 
acquisitions in the global South are keenly aware that it is a particular 
economic model (aimed at achieving capital accumulation and growth 
at almost any cost), which is ultimately at the heart of most contempo-
rary dispossession. They understand that while titles and legal reform 
may serve them in short-term battles, the true ‘solutions’ lie elsewhere.
Finally, the discussion in this article has various implications for 
broader theoretical debates. Orthodox and heterodox scholars alike 
concur that the establishment/enforcement of private property is essen-
tial to capitalist market economies, but very little has been said about 
the role of expropriations (the direct infringement of these rights) in 
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sthis same socio-economic system. As noted above, critical scholars —for 
good reasons— have mostly focused on enclosures or the links between 
land dispossession and the establishment/expansion of modern private 
property rights. They tend to neglect the fact that, once established, 
capitalist land markets don’t always provide land and resources, in the 
right places, at the right price —relative, that is, to the demands of capital 
accumulation and growth—. In this sense, it is time we started adding 
some new questions and issues to the debates on land grabbing.
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